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Constitutional Law: 
Funding Restrictions and Separation of Powers1 
 
Zachary S. Price 
 
Congress’s “power of the purse”—its authority to deny access to 
public funds—is one of its most essential constitutional authorities. In 
our era of political polarization, that power has also emerged as a 
recurrent source of bare-knuckle inter-branch conflict.  In recent years, 
the federal government has “shut down” repeatedly as political 
disagreements between Congress and the executive branch prevented 
enactment of new appropriations to keep federal agencies running past 
the expiration of prior appropriations.  Congress also has sought to 
thwart key presidential objectives—such as President Obama’s 
campaign pledge to close the Guantanamo Bay prison and President 
Trump’s pledge to build a border wall—through funding restrictions, 
and presidents have at times claimed statutory or constitutional 
authority to circumvent such restrictions. 
These conflicts raise an important and under-theorized separation-
of-powers question: To what degree, if at all, may Congress employ its 
power over appropriations to prevent or control how presidents exercise 
their constitutional executive authorities?  Could Congress, for 
example, condition appropriations on the President’s issuance of a 
particular pardon?  Could Congress prevent or require investigation and 
prosecution of particular federal offenses through appropriations 
restrictions, notwithstanding the president’s responsibility to “take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed”?  Or could it prevent or require a 
particular use of military force even though the Constitution makes the 
president “Commander in Chief” of the armed forces? 
Presidents, legislators, and courts have articulated divergent 
positions on these questions.  President Trump, for example, asserted 
authority in a signing statement to disregard a provision barring use of 
Justice Department appropriations to prosecute state-authorized 
medical-marijuana businesses, yet Congress asserted the opposite view 
by repeatedly enacting the provision in question. 
This chapter offers a summarized analysis of this question.  
Concretely, it argues that the answers to the questions above on the 
pardon power, law enforcement, and military force are no, yes, and yes, 
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respectively.  It also defends Congress’s authority to restrict prisoner 
transfers out of Guantanamo Bay and limit marijuana enforcement. The 
key to analyzing all these questions, the chapter argues, is to distinguish 
between executive powers that are “resource-independent” and those 
that are instead “resource-dependent.”  Resource-independent powers, 
which include the pardon power as well as the veto, appointment 
authority, and supervisory control over the military, may at least 
theoretically be exercised by the president personally and therefore may 
not be controlled through restricted or conditional appropriations.  
Resource-dependent powers, by contrast, which include law 
enforcement and affirmative use of military force, depend on 
congressional appropriations for their exercise and may therefore be 
controlled by limits Congress enacts in appropriations statutes. 
 
Framing the Problem 
 
Congress’s “power of the purse,” once described by the great 
scholar Edward Corwin as “the most important single curb” on 
presidential authority,2 is the basic constitutional principle that the 
people’s representatives in Congress control both public revenue and 
public expenditure.  The Constitution expressly grants Congress the 
authority to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” and 
“to borrow Money on the credit of the United States.”  It also grants 
Congress power “to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defense and general Welfare of the United States,” to “raise and 
support Armies,” and to “provide and maintain a Navy,” although no 
army appropriation may exceed two years in duration and Congress 
must provide for a regular accounting of public expenditures.  The 
Constitution makes these congressional powers exclusive.  The 
Appropriations Clause provides: “No Money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”  
Money thus may flow neither in to nor out from the public purse 
without advance congressional approval by statute. 
Historically, this power over appropriations played a key role in 
Anglo-American constitutional development.  Through control over 
appropriations, the British Parliament extracted constitutional 
concessions from the crown.  Colonial legislatures followed suit with 
respect to royal governors; indeed, royal efforts to cut governors loose 
from local purse strings provided one impetus for the American 
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Revolution.  Given this background, the Framers naturally recognized 
legislative control over government finance as a key check on the other 
branches.  In the Federalist No. 58, James Madison described 
Congress’s power of the purse as “the most complete and effectual 
weapon with which any constitution can arm the representatives of the 
people.”  He also called it “that powerful instrument by which we 
behold, in the history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble 
representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its 
activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have 
wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the 
government.” 
This congressional authority is no less important today.  Through 
accumulated statutory delegations and accreted executive practice, the 
executive branch today often holds significant power to take action or 
set policy in the first instance, in areas ranging from regulatory policy 
to law enforcement to foreign affairs.  Against this background, 
congressional authority over appropriations remains an important back-
end constraint on the Executive.  If it disapproves of executive actions 
or policy, it might override or limit the president’s choices by denying 
government funds in the next annual appropriation. 
Understanding Congress’s appropriations power as a structural 
check on the executive, however, masks an important conceptual 
puzzle.  Our Constitution, unlike Britain’s, generally does not allow 
leveraged adjustment of relative interbranch authorities through 
ordinary legislation; it instead fixes in place certain authorities for each 
branch.  From that point of view, using appropriations power to 
constrain executive authorities could violate the Constitution, but by 
the same token an unfettered presidential authority to disregard 
appropriations restraints could eliminate an important legislative check 
on executive policy.  This problem emerged early in the country’s 
history in debates over appropriations for treaty obligations, yet it has 




Distinguishing between executive authorities that are “resource-
independent” and those that are “resource-dependent” can yield a 
coherent and normatively satisfying framework that accords not only 
with the constitutional text and structure but also with the broad 
contours of historical practice.  Resource-independent powers are those 
that are at least theoretically costless: Presidents in principle may 
exercise them personally, keeping their own counsel and using only 
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their own salary or other personal resources.  The key examples here 
are the powers to veto legislation, grant clemency, appoint and remove 
officers, issue lawful commands to the military, demand written 
opinions from department heads, and recommend legislation. 
The key characteristic of these powers, again, is their notional 
costlessness. In a celebrated essay from 1976, Charles Black asked 
himself, “To what state could Congress, without violating the 
Constitution, reduce the President?”  His answer: “I arrived at a picture 
of a man living in a modest apartment, with perhaps one secretary to 
answer the mail; that is where one appropriation bill could put him, at 
the beginning of a new term. . . .  But he was still vetoing bills.”3  
Black’s observations capture the veto’s fundamental independence 
from public resources provided for its support.  But other executive 
powers have the same qualities.  Even the enfeebled president that 
Black imagined could also issue pardons, send nominees to the Senate, 
fire executive officers who displeased him, issue lawful military 
commands, and try his or her hand at drafting legislation, among other 
things. 
Insofar as they are not dependent on congressional appropriations 
to exercise these powers, presidents also should not be bound by 
appropriations restrictions on how those powers are exercised.  
Accordingly, direct conditions on resource-independent powers are per 
se invalid.  Congress may not prevent particular exercises of these 
powers by denying appropriations for them; nor may it condition funds 
for the White House or executive agencies on the president exercising 
or not exercising these powers in a particular way.  Indeed, in at least 
some cases, giving effect to such appropriations provisions would 
profoundly distort the constitutional structure.  On some level, for 
example, the veto and pardon powers are executive checks on 
legislative authority.  It would make no sense if Congress could control 
those powers’ exercise through appropriations legislation. 
The question becomes more complicated with respect to what I call 
“indirect conditions.”  What if Congress does not directly restrict the 
exercise of resource-independent powers, but instead attempts to 
manipulate their exercise through selective provision of staff support 
and other resources?  A version of this problem arose during the 
Obama Administration when Congress denied funds for a White House 
“Climate Change Czar.”  Although President Obama objected to this 
provision on constitutional grounds, he appears to have complied with 
it in practice.  A more routine version of this problem arises when 
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Congress attempts to prevent or require drafting of legislation by 
executive agencies.  The executive branch views such legislation, too, 
as unconstitutional because it limits presidential authority to 
recommend to Congress “such Measures as [the president] shall judge 
necessary and expedient.”4 
Contrary to some executive branch assertions, such indirect 
restraints on resource-independent powers are unconstitutional only in 
narrow circumstances.  As a general matter, Congress holds broad 
authority to structure the executive branch and direct greater resources 
to some functions than others.  Nevertheless, by analogy to certain 
“unconstitutional conditions” case law, including the Supreme Court’s 
decision in NFIB v. Sebelius that the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid 
expansion was unconstitutionally coercive,5 the article argues that some 
constraints on executive branch funding and personnel may unduly 
manipulate executive judgments that properly belong to the president 
alone. 
Specifically, the article argues that Congress may not provide close 
advisers to the president while preventing use of such advisers for 
particular narrow purposes, such as granting particular categories of 
pardons or coordinating administrative actions with respect to some 
particular narrow policy goal, such as mitigating climate change or 
improving energy-independence.  By this standard, the Climate Change 
Czar provision approached the constitutional line but did not cross it, 
given that the president could readily pursue the same policy goals 
using other, more general-purpose White House personnel.  With 
respect to other executive personnel, an appropriations restriction could 
likewise violate the Constitution if it prevented the president from 
employing the most natural officer for a particular purpose.  The 
executive branch has thus been correct to disregard legislation that, for 
instance, prevents the EPA from assisting in drafting new 
environmental legislation, but it does not follow that the president may 
employ whomever he chooses within the executive branch to assist 
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Other executive authorities have a completely different character. 
In particular, law enforcement and warfare are powers presidents 
cannot hope to exercise on their own.  They are instead thoroughly 
dependent on resources—resources that the Appropriations Clause 
makes clear only Congress can provide.  Even assuming doing so 
would be lawful, a president might ride out on her own, pistol or 
handcuffs in hand, but without support from armies or investigators, 
she would not accomplish much in terms of protecting the nation or 
redressing crime.  In fact, the relevant constitutional provisions 
expressly recognize this resource-dependence.  The Take Care Clause 
assigns responsibility for enforcing federal law to the president, but the 
Clause’s indirect formulation—obligating the president to “take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed,” not to execute them directly—
contemplates that the president will be dependent on other officers to 
carry out this function.  Likewise, the Commander in Chief Clause 
grants presidents power only insofar as Congress has given them 
something to command. 
Given the president’s thorough-going dependence on 
appropriations to exercise these powers, it follows that Congress may 
impose whatever conditions it likes in appropriations legislation.  
Congress may, for example, as it routinely does, deny appropriations to 
enforce particular regulations or administrative understandings.  By the 
same token, it may prevent enforcement of disfavored statutes, as it has 
done in recent years by barring use of Justice Department funds to 
prosecute state-authorized medical-marijuana distributors.  President 
Trump’s signing statement suggesting otherwise was thus mistaken.  
Admittedly, like Trump, some historical presidents, including 
Rutherford Hayes and Ronald Reagan, have asserted instead that their 
responsibility to ensure faithful execution of the laws is independent of 
any congressional authority over resources.  But in practice they have 
never meaningfully acted on this view.  Historical practice thus 
powerfully confirms the structural inference that law enforcement 
authority is resource dependent and, as such, subject to plenary 
congressional control. 
Much the same pattern applies to use of military force.  Although 
presidents have sometimes asserted preclusive authority over troop 
dispositions and use of military force, they appear to have generally 
complied with express limitations on their deployment or use of the 
Armed Forces.  In keeping with that practice, historic limitations on use 
of force in Southeast Asia at the close of the Vietnam War were 
generally valid.  Likewise, legislation being considered in Congress 
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that would mandate continued deployments in Syria or South Korea 
would be binding on the executive branch. 
 
The Hard Case of Diplomacy 
 
A last hard question relates to presidential authority over foreign 
affairs.  To be sure, some aspects of presidential foreign affairs 
authority may be easily classified.  To the extent it is valid as a matter 
of first principles, the presidential authority to recognize foreign states, 
governments, and territory6 is resource independent and thus subject to 
the same analysis outlined above for the pardon and veto powers.  In 
contrast, affirmative provision of foreign aid is clearly resource-
dependent, some historic presidential assertions to the contrary 
notwithstanding. 
The power that defies easy analysis is diplomacy, in the sense of 
actual diplomatic communication.  As a matter of first principles, this 
power might properly be considered resource dependent: A president’s 
power to communicate with foreign officials might be dependent on 
Congress’s choice to provide ambassadors and other diplomatic 
resources.  Longstanding practice, however, supports exclusive 
presidential authority over official diplomatic communications with 
foreign states.  In keeping with that view, presidents have in fact defied 
appropriations limitations on diplomatic activity with some regularity. 
Even granting this practice and the basic theory of presidential 
authority that underlies it, however, limiting principles applicable to 
indirect conditions on other resource-independent presidential powers 
should apply equally in this context.  Accordingly, Congress may not 
preclude any use of the State Department or other government 
resources to make certain communications; nor may it prevent 
presidents from using the most natural official, such as the U.S. 
ambassador to a particular foreign state, from relaying the President’s 
preferred view.  It may, however, structure the overall diplomatic 
apparatus at a higher level of generality, providing more resources to 
some embassies and divisions than others, even if doing so has some 
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Fitting constitutional executive authorities together with 
Congress’s power over appropriations presents a structural puzzle that 
has received insufficient scholarly attention.  Distinguishing between 
resource-independent and resource-dependent executive powers 
provides the proper means of resolving increasingly common 
interbranch conflicts over this question.  Some executive powers are 
resource-independent and thus largely immune to congressional control 
through restricted or conditional appropriations.  Others, most notably 
law enforcement and warfare, are resource-dependent and thus subject 
to near-plenary congressional control.  Recognizing this distinction and 
its proper implications provides a coherent and satisfactory means of 
resolving recurrent disputes over relative congressional and executive 
constitutional authority with respect to government finance. 
Current political polarization and animosity appears to give 
presidents powerful incentives to defy appropriations restrictions that 
thwart policy goals favored by their constituents.  But we can ill-afford 
further erosion of this important constraint on executive governance.  
Recognizing the proper contours and limits of executive authority to 
defy appropriations restrictions may help sustain a meaningful system 
of checks and balances in the years ahead. 
